Abstract: This is an attempt, albeit brief, to provide some historical observations on the hypothesis in Jonathan Glover's article that U.S. academics and standard setters have at some point swapped postures with respect to oughtness and descriptive generalization -that is, as between normativism and positivism.
places. It's an interesting and provocative suggestion. As will be shown, standard setters did largely follow this pattern (albeit with active oversight by the regulator), but the direction taken by the committees of the American Accounting Association since then has been more difficult to characterize.
I adopt Jonathan's definition of positive and normative, as follows: "By a positive orientation, I mean observed practice serves as the starting point we try to understand, abstract from, and generalize. By a normative orientation, I mean an attempt to prescribe what practice should be." In regard to advice-giving by committees of academics, I interpret "normative" as referring to the committees' conveying their members' views, or opinions, about proper practice. "Positive" in this context means the committees' synthesizing the findings of empirical research. In terms of the work of a standard setter -because all of its utterances are per se prescriptions about what practice should be -I interpret "normative" as signifying the endeavor to change practice, to improve practice, and not just to codify or rationalize existing practice. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as will be seen below, exhorted the standard setter to "narrow the areas of difference," that is, to remove options. I therefore interpret "normative" to include also the standard setter's response to this insistent charge from the SEC.
When discussing normative research in the academic accounting literature, I confine this set to what I have called normative policy prescription, or traditional normative research, as distinguished from information economics and other mathematical model-building research (Dyckman & Zeff, 1984, pp. 227-229) .
This paper is divided into three sections: academics, the standard setters operating under the influence of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and conclusion. Especially during the Accounting Principles Board (APB) period, from 1959 to 1973, one cannot discuss the APB without also assaying the influential role of the SEC's accounting staff. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 delegated to the SEC the authority to determine the content of the financial statements for companies subject to its jurisdiction. But since the late 1930s, the SEC has regularly looked to the private sector for leadership in recommending proper accounting practice, which has been known since the early 1970s as the setting of accounting standards. Yet, the SEC has always made it clear that it is the final arbiter of proper practice.
Academics
As Jonathan's paper discusses how academics and standard setters have traded places, I think it makes sense to examine the changing role of academics in relation to the way they have undertaken to advise the standard setters. Other roles played by academics in giving advice to the FASB or the SEC -for example, serving as academic fellows -do not lead to a published record of the kind of advice they gave, whether mostly synthesizing research findings or conveying their opinion on what constitutes best practice.
I will focus here on the institutional advice-giving by the American Accounting Association (AAA). In 1936, mentioned by Jonathan in his paper, the AAA began issuing a series of statements on accounting principles, drafted either by its executive committee or by a committee chosen specifically for this purpose. The "principles" statements were issued in 1936, 1941, 1948, and 1957 Concepts and Standards, 1977) , which was also a report by a special committee of accounting academics, which was charged with writing a statement "that would provide the same type of survey and distillation of current thinking on accounting theory" as ASOBAT had in 1966 (p. ix). Instead of being normative, its report comprehensively reviewed and examined the theory literature, in a positivist vein, and concluded that there was no one theoretical approach which had risen to a position of prominence relative to the others. Until this point, Jonathan's thesis that, after the early 1970s, the academics had changed their posture from normative to positive can be supported.
The next phase of the AAA's academic advice-giving to the standard setter began in the 1990s, when its Financial Accounting Standards Committee wrote reports, all published in Accounting Horizons, on exposure drafts and other tentative documents issued for the most part by the FASB. Some of the exposure drafts on which the committee wrote reports were issued by the International Accounting Standards Board or by the SEC. From 1993 to 1996, the committee published 18 such reports, and they were all normative. From 1997 to 1999, the committee issued nine more such reports, of which five were normative and four were positive. Thus, the committee's move toward issuing positive reports had begun, wherein it confined its role to reviewing the findings in the research literature so as to throw useful light on the issues being raised by the standard setter. From 2000 to 2004, all ten such reports were positivist. Since then, the 18 committee reports published between 2005 and 2012 have reflected a mix of normative and positive approaches, depending, apparently, on the composition of the committee, or perhaps on the intention of the chair or of the member designated as the primary author. I understand that some AAA presidents, when constituting the committee, may have preferred either a normative or a positive approach, and chose the members and gave the committee its charge correspondingly. Overall, then, the AAA committee reports from 1993 onward were normative, then positive, and then a mixture of both. This trend does not do much to confirm Jonathan's thesis.
In addition, a committee of the AAA's Financial Accounting and Reporting Section published four comments on drafts -one in 2008, one in 2009, and two in 2010. One was normative and three were positivist. But, this is a very small sample.
One should also comment on the general trend in the character of published accounting research over this span of time. Prior to the 1970s, normative research was predominant in US journals and in books, but beginning in the 1960s, mainly fueled by the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation reports of 1959 on business education as well as the follow-on Ford Foundation financial support, and the development of high-speed computers and rich databases, accounting research shifted strongly toward empirical work, and normative research correspondingly received much less attention in the journals (see Dyckman & Zeff, 1984) . By the 1980s, there was very little normative research being published in the premier US accounting research journals. Three of the early SEC chief accountants from (William W. Werntz, Earle C. King, and Barr) beat back a series of attempts by the CAP and the APB from the 1940s to the 1960s to recommend upward revaluations of tangible fixed assets and general price-level accounting (Zeff, 2007a) . Thus, in respect of just these facets of financial reporting, the standard setter sought to have an impact on practice but was "trumped" by the SEC. On some other subjects taken up in the 1940s and early 1950s, the CAP did little more than codify practice (and often allowed optional practices), or if it did attempt to change practice, the SEC sometimes rebuffed the attempt (Storey, 1964, pp. 48-51; Zeff, 1972, pp. 150-160) .
In the latter 1950s, the CAP attempted to be more normative, when it issued Accounting Research Bulletins 44 Revised, 47, and 48 on income tax allocation, pensions, and business combinations, respectively, although these recommendations represented only modest changes in practice. One of the factors precipitating the CAP's initiatives to influence accounting practice, rather than just codify it, was the frequent speeches by Leonard Spacek, the outspoken managing partner of Arthur Andersen & Co., who criticized the CAP for allowing so much flexibility in accounting practice (Zeff, 1972, pp. 169-170 ). Spacek's aggressive stance had much to do with the AICPA's decision in 1959 to replace the CAP with the APB (Zeff, 2001) .
In 1962, the recently established APB approved, by the narrowest majority, only one method of accounting for the investment tax credit, but pressure from the Treasury Department led the SEC to allow two methods, which was an embarrassing setback for the APB (Moonitz, 1966) . Until the middle of the 1960s, the APB had been having difficulty securing agreement among its members to "narrow the areas of difference in accounting practice," which had been the SEC's charge to the CAP and then to the APB. There was a philosophical difference among several of the Big Eight accounting firms over how much flexibility should be allowed in its Opinions (Zeff, 2001, p. 149) . SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen (chairman from 1964 to 1969) had been criticizing the APB in speeches for its lack of activism in narrowing the areas of difference in practice (Zeff, 1972, pp. 189, 192) , and Cohen actually had the SEC issue an Accounting Series Release (ASR) in 1965 to prescribe proper accounting practice in an area when the APB found itself unable do so itself (Zeff, 2007b) . Under this pressure from the SEC, the APB began to issue a series of important normative Opinions between 1967 and 1971 that changed practice: Opinion 11, accounting for income taxes; 15, earnings per share; 16, business combinations; 17, intangible assets; 18, the equity method of accounting for investments in common stock; 19, reporting changes in financial position (i.e., fund statements); 20, accounting changes; and 21, interest on receivables and payables (i.e., requiring the use of present values) (Zeff, 1972, pp. 200-218) . Some of these, such as the required publication of a funds statement and the required use of present values for long-term receivables and payables, represented major changes in practice. Clearly, the APB was steadfastly normative during its latter years, but under the heavy hand of the SEC. Only intense political lobbying in 1971-1972 prevented the Board from progressing toward the development of Opinions that might have changed practice on accounting for the investment tax credit, accounting for marketable securities, oil and gas accounting, and accounting for leases.
In 1972, John C. (Sandy) Burton became the SEC chief accountant, and he aggressively pushed for expanded disclosures, including lessee disclosures (ASR 147, issued in 1973) , inventory profits disclosure (ASR 151, issued in 1974) , and replacement cost accounting supplementary disclosure (ASR 190, issued in 1976) .
The FASB was formed in 1973 as an independent body (instead of another committee of the AICPA), and it was therefore believed to be free of the influence of the major accounting firms, which always were represented on the CAP and the APB. The FASB from 1973 onward generally adopted a normative stance, but at times it has been forced to compromise because of political lobbying (see Zeff, 2012) . Thus, I think the record largely supports Jonathan about the normativism of the standard setter since the latter part of the 1960s. But one must interject that the standard setter has not been free of influence from the SEC or from powerful interest groups.
The SEC continued to exert influence on the FASB, although it was not as intrusive as it had been in the processes of the CAP and the APB. Two illustrations of its influence were the following. In 1991, SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden effectively forced the FASB to place accounting for marketable securities on its agenda, else he said that the SEC would issue a release of its own on the subject. Breeden wanted to see a requirement for mark-to-market accounting (Johnson & Swieringa, 1996, p. 158) . This led to SFAS 115, which was a compromise solution driven by intense lobbying from the banking industry, yet it changed accounting practice (Zeff, 2012, pp. 248-249) . In 1996, the SEC chief accountant, speaking at an open meeting of the FASB's Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council, complained that "pooling of interests" questions from companies were consuming 40 to 50 percent of his staff's time, and he said that he would like to see the FASB issue a standard on the matter. The FASB was already contemplating a project on poolings, but the urging from the chief accountant pushed it over the line, and business combinations promptly appeared on the FASB's agenda. 
Conclusion
As to academics, their AAA committees were uniformly normative until the end of the 1960s and then became positivist for a major report issued in 1977. But they have veered between normativist and positivist in their many reports on exposure drafts from 1993 to 2012. So, a generalization about their behavior is not easily made.
As to the standard setters, the APB issued important normative recommendations between 1967 and the early 1970s, and it would have issued even more had political lobbying not intervened. Since it began operations in 1973, the FASB has been normative even in the face of political lobbying.
The standard setter, as prodded by the SEC, indeed turned normativist beginning in the late 1960s, as Jonathan argues, although it is interesting to recall the series of attempts by the CAP and the APB from the 1940s to the 1960s to adopt normative positions in favor of the upward revaluation of tangible fixed assets and general price-level accounting which were defeated by the intervention of the SEC.
